if 'A ±s_ B' then they are not distinct. This peculiar situ ation can be described by means of the an moment. Since A is defined by^B, this latter (B), the being of A, is in it (A) (ari ihm) .
But because A can be distinguished from B, A is in itself (ari sich) different from B. A category's like ness with itself in opposition to its unlikeness is its "initself-being" (ansichsein).
These two forms of the an_ moment, an sich and an ihm, both refer to the positedness or being of the category; ari is the general moment of being of a category.
On the other hand, the fiir moment expresses the relation of the category to other categories. In a predication, 'A is B, ' the predicate is for (fiir ) the subject. A category which defines a second category (A) is both maintained in the second category and separate from it. As so related to A, B is for A, or B is for-another (fiir Anderes ) . Actu ally, subject and predicate stand in this relation in any predication. Thus, in any predication, 'A is B, ' the pre dicate is for the subject (für Anderes). On the other hand, a category which lacks relation with other categories is only "for itself" (fiir sich).
Thus the two forms of the fiir moment, fiir Anderes and fiir sich, describe the cate gory's relation with other categories; für is the general moment of a category which describes its relation to other categories.
Therefore, an is the moment of the^eing of a category, and fiir is the moment of its relation.
These .) The difference between the fiir moment of the Logic and the für moment of the Phenomenology expresses the difference between these two works, and shows the latter as a work intrinsically related to our (the knower's) con sciousness .
are closely related; both are present in a predication. When one category is predicated of another, the second category is both for-another ( fiir Anderes ) and in this other (ari ihm) . Other relations among these momen^j are developed and explored in the course of the Logic.
The question which motivated this discussion of the moments was how a self-relation could express more than trivial identity. We now see that in one form of self relation, self-predication, a predication gives rise to (or at any rate explicates) the moments of a category. In asserting a self-predication, 1 A is A 1, We are asserting that the category A has an ihm the category A. What A is an sich, as distinguished from any predicate we might apply to it, is just what is predicated of it in the self-predication. Thus, through self-predication, A is an sich A. Further, in this predication, A is not related to another category. It is not fiir Anderes, but fiir sich. These moments, an_ sich and fiir sich, are moments of the category itself. In participating in its own self-predication, the category A has acquired a new content; it has acquired the moments of an sich and fiir sich. Before its self-predication the category has a posited content. In predicating the category of itself, we add to this posited content that the category is self-related. The an and fiir mechanism trans lates the fact that the category is realted to another cate gory or to itself into a moment of the category. Since the category has acquired these néw moments, it is no longer the same category which lacked these moments, that category has undergone a transition (iibergeht ) into a new category. We should note that a category which is self-related acquires the moments of an sich and fiir sich. This determination, to be an unj^fiir sich, is precisely the characterization of essence.
The reason we do not pass into essence with these self-predications is that a category which is selfpredicated becomes another category, and this new category contains within itself the self-relation of the first but does not itself participate in its own self-relation. When the categories of being are self-predicated, they pass over into new categories which latter are not yet self-predicated. Only with essence does a category not become another cate gory in being self-related. This mechanism is difficult to grasp in this abstract formulation; it will become clear when we examine specific categories. It is, however, clear that the self-predication of a category adds new content to '*''*'E.g. SL, p p . 120-122, where the moment of fiir Anderes is identified with that of an sich. 12SL, p. 390, 1. 16. 94 A-9 the category, and is not merely an identity. Therefore, the means whereby the Logic is a presuppositionless science, self-relation, does not restrict logic to insignificant identities; in self-relation, new content is added to a category.
The significance of the an^ and fur moments is, then, that through them the fact that a category is defined or related to another category can be expressed as a property of the category itself. These moments are crucial if Hegel is to show that the dialectic of the category is the category it self, for it is through these moments that the one becomes the other. We will better understand how the moments func tion when we go through some of the arguments of the Logic. We should, however, note that the status of these moments is not clear. They are called moments and are said to express the relation of ç^tegories, while they are also distinguished from categories.
They initially appear as determinations parallel to something and other which express the relation of these two categories, as being-in-itself and being-foranother. As such, "each.. .contains w i t^n itself its other moment which is distinguished from it."
The determinations of being are related as others; it is tljigse of essence which contains their other within themselves.
Thus, this rela tion of the ail and für moments sounds very much like a deter mination of essence. If, in fact, a determination of essence has been imported into the sphere of being, then the logic is not, as Hegel has claimed, the presuppositionless genesis of the categories, for a category of essence would be pre supposed in being. This is quite a serious charge against Hegel, and I am not sure whether his position can be justi fied. This criticism, however, rests upon an understanding of the relation of being and essence. I do not propose to examine the criticsm any further in this paper; instead one of the goals of this paper will be to achieve an understanding of this relation.
To summarize the discussion up to this point, we have seen that Logic can be a presuppositionless exposition of the cate gories through the self-relation of the categories, and further that this self-relation is not merely an identity, but adds a new moment to the category. One answer which might be suggested is that when we in quire into the nature of a category, the category is present implicitly already and we seek to make the implicit explicit. This answer is not incorrect, but it is inadequate and can be misleading. The difference between the implicit and the explicit content of a category is not apparent; nor is it apparent how the two can contradict each other. A more fruitful and exact answer depends upon recognizing that the phrase wlji^ch is often translated as "implicit" is, in German, an sich.
In answer to the question, 'what is X?', we relate X to other categories or to itself; in other words, we explicate the für moment of the category. Thus, a more explicit answer to the question of what we know and what we seek when we inquire into a category is that we know the category ail sich and we seek to explicate what the category is für sich or für Anderes. As compared with the other suggested answer, that we know the category implicitly and seek to make it explicit, this answer in terms of the moments has the advantage of making the difference between the un defined and defined category intelligible. Further, if our earlier assertion that the two moments can contradict each other is correct, then the analysis of the definition of a category in terms of these moments explains how the category as defined can be in contradiction with the category before it is defined. This explanation of the contradiction in a category is somewhat different than we might be led to expect if we think of the internal contradiction of a category as arising when the implicit meaning of the category is made explicit. If the contradiction is between the ari and für moments of a category, then it does not merely arise when the category is made explicit, but because the category is made explicit. The reason for this is that making the category explicit is relating the category to other cate gories, it is explicating the für moment of the category, and it is in the opposition between this moment and the ail moment that the contradiction lies. Thus, the contradiction that lies in a category arises from the definition of the category, from the attempt to define the categories in terms of other categories. In itself (an sich) the category is not contradictory. It is through the attempt to explicate the category that the contradiction arises. From this we infer that if we were content to leave the categories be what they are, no contradiction need arise, it is in the requirement that an exposition of the category be given; i.e., that the categories be thought, that the contradic tions arise in particular categories. This requirement is central to logic, which, as a science, is just an exposition of categories.
In summary the an and fur analysis of the categories pro vides a means of understanding how a self-predication might lead to a contradiction, and of differentiating what we begin with and what we seek in an exposition of a category. We fur ther suggested that the relation between these two is that a contradiction arises in each category just in our defining it. The discussion thus far has (1) been based upon an abstract discussion of these issues, and it has (2) primarily drawn on the categories of being. Self-predication and selfcontradiction will be clearer if we examine the arguments which constitute the exposition of different categories. If we first examine arguments of some of the categories of being, we will be able to better understand how the mode of exposi tion of the categories of being, predication, differs from the mode of exposition of essence. If we entered into all the details of the arguments, we would lose sight of self predication. Consequently, we will present only the broad outlines of the argument.
I
That self-predication plays a role in the logic of being is only apparent upon examination. Each of the categories of the major sections of quality is self-predicated and this predication also leads to the collapse of the category. "Being is", and the is-ness of being is nothing. "Deter minate being is a determinate b|i^ng, a something. Further, the final cate gory of the sphere of being, indifference, is self-deter mined and its collapse results in the collapse of the entire sphere. Let us sketch the arguments which establish these determinations .
The Logic begins with being. Being is pure thought; it is without determination. A determination is a mediation; thus being, as lacking determination, is, in itself, (an sich), immediacy. Since it is through determination of predication that one category is related to another category, being's lack of determination is its lack of relation to any other category. The relation of one category to itself or to another category is described by its fur moments. Since being lacks any determinations, i.e. any relations, it lacks any für moment. It is neither für sich nor für Anderes. Being is only like itself ("nur sich selbst gleich"), ^ but this expression is not yet its self-relation but the lack of any relation at all. Because it lacks all determination, being is the most abstract of categories and it thereby includes everything. If being includes everything then it also includes itself; hence, being is. But being also has no relation to any category. Thus what being is, what it is für, is nothing. Because being is a determination of everything, it determines itself, but it determines itself without determination; as nothing. T^| self-predication is, then, also the contradiction of being.
The result of this contradiction in being is eventually the category2^f determinate being, the simple unity of being and nothing.
Since this unity of determinate being is a simple unity, it is a unity without determination; i.e., As will be seen, participles are consistently used as the predicative form of a category. We will consider the significance of this fact after we have explicated some other arguments for the self-predication of categories of the sphere of being.
The form of predication suggests that the two categories, being and determinate being, are the same: determinate being is being. But this form also presupposes a distinction between the two categories. Determinate being, iri itself, is not the same as determinate being which has been determined as being. In being determined, determinate being undergoes a transition to a new category; it becomes "quality."
Determinate being is, then, determined by the category of being. But determinate being is, in itself, the unity of being and nothing; it is not merely being. Thus, determinate being negates its determination as being. Determinate being is equally determined and not determined as being: it is equally true that 1Dasein ist seiend1 and 1Dasein ist nicht seiend.1 We have only to recall the meaning of determinate being to be struck by these determinations. Determinate being is itself the unity of being and not-being. Since determinate being is determined as being and not-l^ging, deter minate being is a determinate b^ng, a something.
( "Das Dasein ist Daseiendes, Etwas. " ) Determinate being is, an sich, the simple unity of being and nothing. These latter are, then, the moments of deter minate being. However, in the unity which is determinate being, these moments are negated. As alternately affirming and negating its own moments, determinate being stands in the relation of determinate being to its own moments. The self-predication of determinate being thereby expresses that the posited content of determinate being, the simple unity of being and not-being, is mirrored in the relation this category has with its moments; it affirms and negates them. Thus, the category of determinate being is the very relation it has with its moments. In accord with the participial form used in the self-predication to express the category's rela tion to its moments, we can say that determinate being is what it does. We have been able to argue that determinate being is determined by itself. Thus determinate being is self-related. But this self-relation is not achieved through the negation of a relation to other categories. As we have seen, determinate being is determined by being. Therefore, the self-relation of determinate being is not yet the self-relation of fiir sich. Instead, the self-relation of determinate being is "determin ate being's own determinateness."
Recalling the language we used to describe the moments of predication, the being of determinate being lies in its determination, which is just determinate being. Determinate being is an determinate being; therefore, determinate being is an sich. An sich, the moment of being, is also simple self-relation because being is selfrelated (nur sich selbst gleich); and the self-relation which is the content of determinate being is this ari sich. Thus, through its self-predication and the ari and fiir mechanism, determinate being acquires the content of being self-related. But determinate being is in itself only the simple unity of being and nothing. This new content which is added to the category through its self-predication negates the original simple unity. Hence, self-determined determinate being must pass over into a new category. It incomes something, "simple self-relation in the form of being."
We have seen that deter minate being is self-related, but that this self-relation does not belong to the content (an sich) of the category, and that when self-relation is posited in the content, determinate being becomes something. Hence, determinate being is what it does, but this relation does not lie in its content. The self-relation of determinate being is, then, the transition of the category into something.
In this argument, I have shown how self-relation is used to predicate determinate being of itself, the meaning of self predication, and how this predication changed the content of the category. This change resulted in the transition of determinate being to a different category, something. This argument would not suffice as an explication of determinate being. My goal here, however, is to explain how a category is self-related. For this purpose it is more important to understand the main movements of the argument than to under stand its details. Let us consider one more self-predication, that of being-for-self (Fürsichsein).
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Being-for-self is posited as the negation of negation; i.e., the sublation of otherness which has returned to it self . As we have noted, a category is fur sich when it lacks a relation to other categories and is only related to itself. Being-for-self (Fürsichsein) is posited as fur sich. In other words, Being-for-self is posited as self-related through the sublation of otherness: being-for-self is, an sich to be für sich. This identification is not to be confused with co-presence of the moments which will characterize essence.
The content (ail sich) of being-for-self is, then, selfrelation. We now turn to the question of determining the relations of being-for-self with other categories, to the explication of its fur moment: what is being-for-self? In reply to this question we cannot predicate another cate gory of being-for-self. As we have seen, in any predication of one category to another each is for the other (für Anderes) and acquires, as a part of its content, this being for other. If, however, the content of being-for-self is only self relation, only to be for itself (fur sich), then no other category can be predicated of it without contradicting its content. It must lack relations with other categories. Thus, because being-for-self is posited as self-relation, it must lack relation with other categories. Being-for-self is then the self-relation which is the sublation of otherness.
In understanding being-for-self as the sublation of other ness, we are involved in a contradiction, for we are defining being-for-self in terms of that with which it is supposed to lack relation, otherness. If being-for-self is defined as the sublating of otherness in self-relation, its very defini tion contains a category, the other, which being-for-self was supposed to exclude. We attempted with being-for-self to arrive at a category which excludes otherness, only to find that the very definition of the category contains it. In more formal terms, being-for-self contains determinate being (the other) because the former is ^ÿe negation of otherness posited in the immediacy of being. 
B-2
Thus determinate being is a moment of being-for-self. What then is the relation of determinate being to beingfor-self? Clearly they are not others, for if they were others to each other, each would be fiir the other. But being-for-self is not fiir any other; it is only fur sich. So, they are not others. Because being-for-self is only for itself, fiir sich, it is not related to other categories. Thus, being-for-self is not related to its moment, deter minate being. These two, determinate being and being-forself, appear to be distinct but the argument will show that if taken as distinguished, they prove indistinguishable. Both are sublated in the unity of self-predicated beingfor-self .
Being-for-self shows itself to be self-contradictory because it is defined by means of its moment, otherness, and yet is supposed to sublate otherness. Thus, beingfor-self is seen as standing alongside of its moment, the other (or determinate being). However, this contradiction can be transcended if being-for-self can sublate the other ness of its own moment, determinate being. Now this is just the meaning of a self-predicated being-for-self. Being-forself which is a being-for-self is that sublation of otherness which sublates the otherness of its own moments. It is left without moments; it is the one. Thus, if it can be shown that being-for-self is self-predicated, the contradiction in undetermined being-for-self is removed.
How then is being-for-self self-predicated? Thus far we have two apparently distinct notions, being-for-self and its moment, determinate being. If we can show that these two are indistinguishable, then the otherness and difference of the moment has been sublated into a unity; and we are thereby entitled to the self-predication of being-for-self. The way in which these two are shown to be indistinguishable is by defining them both in terms of the unity. Initially, they are distinguished and determinate being has arisen because being-for-self is the sublation of otherness and thereby presupposes it. But determinate being is only a moment of being-for-self; it exists only to be sublated in the unity which the latter is supposed to achieve. As a moment, determinate being is fiir Anderes. This other, however, cannot be simply being-for-self because, as we have seen, being-for-self cannot be an other to determinate being. Instead, the other is the unity which being-for-self is supposed to achieve, and does achieve in its self-relatioi^ Determinate being in being-for-self is a "being-for-one. " 32SL, p. 159, 1. 6. Likewise, it can easily be shown that being-for-self, before it is self-related, is also a "being-for-one." This is clear from the fact that the content of being-for-self is only für sich, and that it is merely one side of its even tual self-relation. Since the self-predication of beingfor-self establishes a unity, being-for-self, which is merely a side of^tjhe relation and not yet self-related, is a "beingfor-one,"
It is well to examine this argument in the detail of the ail and für language. The content (au sich) of beingfor-self is simply to be für sich. If another category is predicated of it, being-for-self acguires the content of being für Anderes thereby contradicting its original content. Thus, the only possible predicate of being-for-self is it self. However, when being-for-self is predicated of itself it acquires an additional content. In a self-predication, being-for-self lies an being-for-self, and the category thereby contains the moment of an sich in addition to that of für sich. Since it acquires an additional content in self-predication, being-for-self becomes a new categorythe one^4 ("Das Fürsichsein ist so Fürsichseiendes...das Eins • ") Hence, undetermined being-for-self is merely a moment of the unity which comes to be in its self-predica tion. As a moment, being-for-self is for its own self predication, the one; it is a being-for-one.
Since both determinate being and being-for-self are moments of self-predicated being-for-self, the one, they are both "being-for-one" and thereby indistinguishable. Since being-for-self has sublated the difference between itself and its moment, determinate being, it is determined as a being-for-self. In its self-predication, being-forself has acquired a new content and becomes a new category, the one. Thus, self-predication proves itself unable to express the being of being-for-self, for in its self predication, being-for-self becomes another category and we must begin the process of determination anew.
It is important to understand how the self-predication of being-for-self was achieved--(1) Undetermined being-for-self was distinguished from its moment, determinate being, and (2) both distinguished from the unity of the self-predicated being-for-self. It was then shown that insofar as the two are distinguished from the unity of self-predication, (1) they are identical and therefore (2) they are the unity of 33SL, p. 159, 1. 22. 34WL, I, 182, 11. 7-10.
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self-predicated being-for-self . In short, insofar as beingfor-self and determinate being are distinguished from the unity of self-predicated being-for-self, they are sublated in that unity. In this formulation, the dialectic of the argument is clear. It is clearly not a deductive argument. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic argument, and a similar movement appears in essence, as we shall see.
What remains puzzling about the argument is that it depends upon understanding being-for-self and determinate being as moments of a unity which only comes to be when these two are seen as indistinguishable moments of this unity. The argument presupposes the unity of self-predicated being-for-self in order to establish that unity. Clearly^the argument is circular. But the entire Logic is circular. Circularity in itself is not a sufficient ground for the rejection of an argument; circularity is simply a fact of Hegelian dialectic. What makes this particular argument puzzling, however, is that being-for-self is understood as a moment of a unity which does not yet exist. Why is beingfor-self defined in terms of its self-predication? Under standing Hegel does not depend on making the argument of being-for-self unpuzzling; instead we must attempt to under stand why it is puzzling. The argument for the self-predication of being-for-self reflects the character of the cate gory. The content of being-for-self is to be fur sich; the content does not contain the an element. Because the content of being-for-self does not contain an element which expresses its being, but only the element which expresses its rela tions, the category cannot be understood in terms of its being; i .e., in itself (ari sich) or as defined by another (an ihm) . Instead, the category must be understood in terms of its relation with other categories or itself, in terms of its fur moment. But being-for-self lacks relation to other categories; and, therefore, it can only be understood in terms of its relation to itself. And this self-relation of being-for-self is self-predicated being-for-self, the one. Therefore, because of its content, being-for-self can only be understood in terms of its own self-predication. Thus it is defined by its relation to that self-predication before the latter exists.
Therefore, the puzzle which we have seen in being-forself is a reflection of the character of the category. This explanation does not resolve the puzzle, but it lets us see that it necessarily arises from the nature of the category we are considering. If we understand the argument of being-35SL, p. 71, 1. 22.
for-self as a deduction with the category as its premise, the argument is easily shown to be circular. If, however, we understand the argument as the exposition of the category of being-for-self, it shows us that an understanding of this category presupposes understanding it in terms of its self predication, the one. The argument of being-for-self is not intended to establish a deductive conclusion but to show why and into what the category collapses. Once the argument is given this significance, there is no longer any motive for doubting its validity. Hegel is exploring relations among ideas; we must resist the impulse to impute additional significance to logic. As the self-exposition of the cate gories, the Logic is only the arguments themselves.
In the arguments we have presented, categories are shown to be determined by other categories, and the category which is a predicate usually assumes a participial form.
What is the significance of this form? Grammatically, the present participle functioning as a noun indicates the object which is engaged in the activity expressed by the participle. Thus, Fürsichseiendes refers to an object engaged in the activity of sublating otherness. The self-predication of being-for-self thus indicates that the category being-forself is something which is engaged in the activity of beingfor-self (sublating otherness). The participle predicated of a category is thus distinguished from the subject as the activity of what is posited in the subject.
Why should the predicative forms of the categories of the sphere of being be present participles? This question is one of many that remains puzzling to me. It is, however, possible to externally justify this form by examining its consequences. What Hegel ultimately wants to show is the unity of theoretical and practical, that being is as it presents itself; i.e., that being is what it does. In the sphere of being, the being of the category and its activity are distinct as subject and predicate. The self-predication of a category with its own participles thus asserts the identity of the being of the category with what it does. 3 3 6 The exception is apparently, 'being is.* We should note, however, that this proposition does not specifically appear in the section on being, and that in the section on deter minate being, where being is treated as a predicate, the participial form is used. We might speculate that being has not yet assumed a predicative form in the section devoted to it. However, this is speculation and the issue remains puzzling.
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Therefore, that the predicative form of the categories of being is the participle is significant in that it enables the self-predication of a category to identify the being and activity of a category, and the adequate identifica tion of these two is an ultimate goal of Hegel's logia. Thus, for the attainment of this goal, we should be thank ful that the predicative form of the categories turns out to be the participle. Why the predicative form should be an activity still remains puzzling.
This puzzle as to the predicative form has a counter part in a puzzle concerning the form of the subject. As we have noted, the content of a category (i.e., the cate gory as a subject) consists of the moments of au and f iir. Why should the content have this form? Again, we can justify the form externally. The goal of the Logic, we have noted, is the adequate identification of the posited being and its activity.
In different terms this goal is the adequate identi fication of the an and fur moments. As we have also noted, in a self-predication, a category is an sich and für sich.
This dual determination is a step toward the ultimate identification of these moments; even though this identification fails in the sphere of being because in self-predication a category undergoes a transition to another category. That the content of a category is expressed in terms of ari and für is fortunate in that the moments which the category acquires in self-predica tion are an and für moments. Thus, self-predication seems to contain the possibility of expressing what the category is (its an moment) by means of predication (its für moment). An example is in order. The content (an moment) of one category is to be fur sich. Predicates of this category, in particular, its self-predication express its für moment. But in this self-predication the category also acquires the content of being für sich. Thus, the content acquired from its fûr moment (für sich) is identical with the content of its an moment (fur sich) This identity of the moments proves inadequate because the category acquires additional content by means of its self-predication, namely to be ari sich, and it thereby becomes another category. In short, the advantage of an and fur as the content of the category is that these terms are also the relational moments of the category. That a category is e.g. für sich can express both its content and its relations with another category. Thus, the ultimate goal of the Logic, the identification of being and its relations (or activity) requires terms which can be both content and activity of a category. This dual role of the an and für moments has, no doubt, lent diffi culty to foregoing discussions, but the source of the confusion is, unfortunately, inherent in the subject matter. This justification of the use of an and für to express the content of the categories is again only exter nal; i.e., it enables us to achieve a goal. Why the form of the content of a category is expressed in terms of an and fiir remains puzzling.
In summary, we have established that self-relation is an important idea even in the sphere of being, and shown some of its uses here. While some of the arguments for the self-predication of particular categories have been sketchy, it is hopefully clear at least what is meant by self-predication. It should further be clear that selfpredication adds some new content to the category and the category thereby becomes a new category. In the sphere of essence, as distinct from being, self-relation does not add anything new to the category because the cate gories of essence contain self-relation as a part of their content. Thus in essence,self-relation does not lead to a transition into a new category. In the sphere of being, self-relation is a methodological principle by means of which transitions among categories are effected. In the sphere of essence, however, self-relation is a part of the content of the categories and, therefore, directly treated. Hence, we will consider the transition to essence in detail. In order to understand this trans ition, let us first consider the last category of being and explain why it is the last category.
II
The last category of being is indifference, Gleichgiiltigkeif^ which is the negation of every determination of being.
Being is initially-^ithout determinations. It is "nur sich selbst gleich.» Thus, indifference is the determination of being; for, like being, indiff erence is without determination. But to be without determination is precisely the determination of indiff erence; i.e., indifference is indifferent. Indifference 37SL, p. 375, 1. 8. 3 8 38WL, I, 82, 1. 24.
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is, then, determined as indifferent; but, in itself, indif ference is indifferent to its determination; i.e., indif ference , an sich_ negates any determination. Therefore, indifference negates itself and collapses. Indifference is in itself to lack all determinations. Yet indifference is self-determined. As lacking all determination, in difference is not "for another" but only "for itself." Indifference is self-related. We have noted that self relation asserts that the category stands in the relation of itself to its moments. The moment of indifference is only itself indifference. Thus the self-determination of indifference asserts the indifference of indifference to itself. In general, a self-determination, or indeed any predication, is a transition to another category. But the indifference of indifference is just what indifference is in itself. In other words, the self-determination of indifference is not a transition, but an expression of \^at indifference is in itself, negative relation to itself.
The self-determination of each of the other categories of the sphere of being has negated^he original category, for all determination is negation.
The determinations of these categories were merely others to the category. The category of indifference, however, contains as its content the opposition to any determination. Conseguently, the determination of indifference is not merely an other to it, but the negation of its content as well. The self-determi nation of indifference is thus called the absolute or second negation of it. Noting the conclusion of the last paragraph, we can say that the self-determined indifference is the absolute negation of indifference and also This is a Hegelian way of saying that the analysis of experience in terms of determinations of experience proves contradictory. The contradiction of the category of indif ference stated in these terms is that when we understand the character of the determinations of experience as indifferent to further determinations, we have determined indifference and thereby contradicted it and passed beyond it to a higher level. The understanding of indifference as indifference is a determination of it, and thereby a contradiction of its very nature. In determining indifference we pass beyond it.
Essence emerges because immediate experience proves self contradictory and in order to understand it we must pass beyond it. Essence, then,is something beyond being which explains being.
But what is essence? It seems as if we do not yet have an idea of what this word denotes; all we do
have is an idea of the relation of essence to being. In fact, however, this relation of essence to being, that essence is the beyond of being which truly is, is precisely what the word essence denotes. Let us recall that one of the tasks of the Logic is to show that thought can be understood by means of itself : no transcendent objects are needed in order to understand thought. Therefore, one of the points Hegel makes about essence is that the idea does not denote some thing which lies beyond thought. Essence itself is an idea, and it is simply the idea of something which is beyond being but explains it. In order to show that essence does not lie in anything more than this relation, Hegel need only show that the determinations which we associate with essence apply to this relation. Does the idea of 'something beyond being which explains being' actually explain being and actually lie beyond it? The affirmative answer to this question shows that the determinations of essence apply to the notion of essence proposed. Let us also note that we are here inquiring into the validity of the self-predication of the proposed notion of essence. As in the category of being-for-self, it is the self-relation which justifies the definition of the category. In essence, however, the determination of 'what lies beyond being and explains it' as lying beyond being and explaining it is not a transition to another category. No new content is added to the category in its selfdetermination .
B-10
According to the notion of essence we have proposed, essence is defined in terms of being. The notion is mis leading on two counts. First, essence, as it has emerged from the category indifference, is in-and-for-itself (an und für sich).
Essence must be understood in terms of itself. It is contrary to the nature of essence to < define it by what it is not, being. Second, defining essence in terms of being is impossible because the sphere of being has proven self-contradictory and collapsed. What we want to achieve in the transition to essence is a means of understanding being. Therefore, essence is supposed to explain being and not the other way around. Thus, the first task in the consideration of essence is to explain being in terms of it. But since the only notion we have of essence as yet involves being, this task seems to involve a vicious circle. In other words, what we seek in the consideration of essence is to answer the question, 'what is essence?' if essence is defined as explaining being, then the definition presupposes what it is that essence is to explain, being.
Although the relation of being and essence is circular, the circle is not a vicious one. The way that Hegel defines essence is based on the recognition that both essence and being must be present. First, being is defined in terms of essence. Then, essence is defined by relating itself to this new being, a process reminiscent of the definition of being-for-self as a being-for-one. We can discover how to define being in terms of essence by considering the notion of essence we have mentioned. We need not yet resort to Hegel's technical terminology. Essence is the beyond of being which explains its. (1) Because essence explains being, it is prior to being. From the point of view of essence, being has collapsed an^is nothing in itself. The truth of being lies in essence.
(2) Because essence is the beyond of being, essence is not being. Then it is also true that being is not essence, and the two are related as others. Being, then, is the (first) negation of essence. Taking account of both components of the definition of essence, being is the nothing which is the negation of essence. Since essence is what is in-and-for-itself, what truly is^, it is opposed in its content to being which is defined in essence as nothing. Being, then, is other than essence: it is not essence. But further, being is opposed in itself to what essence is : being is what essence is not : being is notessence. Being is the immediate, and essence is something 41s l , P-391, 1. 19 . 42s l , P-389, 1. 1. which lies beyond the immediate, the not-immediate. Being is the absolute negativity of essence. Essence truly is; being is the negation of essence which is nothing in itself. Being in ess|^ce is nothing more than the negative posited as negative.
With this determination, we have defined being as it is in essence. If being is defined in terms of essence, then being can be explained by essence. Let us recall that this is precisely the reason that essence is introduced. This definition has been based upon the idea that essence is prior to being because the latter must be explained in terms of the former. Let us also notice the sense in which being is prior to essence: essence has emerged out of being. But in this sense, being seems to be independent of essence. Surely, our immediate experience is independent of our way of accounting for that experience. But if our immediate experi ence is independent of essence, then essence is surely not adequate to explain being. If being is not merely the nega tive posited || negative, but "contains an immediate pre supposition." then it is independent of essence and the latter is not its truth. Hegel shows first that (1) being does contain this "immediate side." However, he goes on to show that (2) these determinations which distinguish being from essence are determinations of essence. Finally, we see that (3) essence sublates this determinateness in itself. These three propositions form the core of the section titled "Illusory Being." We will continue arguing in this popular language. Although we thereby avoid the difficulty of Hegel's technical language, we unfortunately cannot avoid the difficulty in the argument. We should, however, con stantly bear in mind the course the dialectic will take. Because being contains a side independent of essence, being is itself a determination of essence (as Schein), and thus essence both determines itself to be and negates this deter mination in its own self. The reason this argument is a dialectic is that it is the independence of being from essence which is the basis for sublating being in essence; because being is independent of essence it is sublated in essence. The dialectic is thus the synthesis of opposites, independence and sublation; it is dialectic in the classical sense . 
B-12
According to its definition in terms of essence, being is negation. In its own sphere being was immediacy. In essence, being seems to have lost its immediacy and becomes negation. But it is the immediacy of being which distinguishes it from essence, even in essence itself: being is the immediate and essence is to be not-immediate. It follows that being as it is in essence, negation, must recover the immediacy which distinguishes it from essence. Hegel does not show merely that immediacy as_ well as negation pertain to being in essence. Instead, he shows the dialectical truth that being in essence is immediate precisely because it is negation as negation. In other words, it is in virtue of the nothingness of being in essence that being is^ (or is immediate) in essence. The complete absence of being in essence is the very reason for its presence. We must not cringe at these paradoxial locu tions; they are a sign of dialectical argumentation where opposite predicates must often be attributed to the same subject. Nevertheless, to avoid these locutions, and to signal the altered meaning of being in^gssence, Hegel terms this latter "illusory being" (Schein).
The immediacy of being in essence which is recovered is not the simple immediacy of being but an immediacy reflected through the negation which being is in essence. The argu ment for this immediacy runs as follows. Being in essence, Schein, is the negative posited as negative; it is the nega tive of essence. As such, Schein is an other to essence. The "other" is a category specifically treated in determinate being where it has presumably been analyzed into two moments, determinate being and the^gegative of determinate being (Dasein and Nichtdasein).
Thus the 'other' contains a moment of being and a moment of negation. But Schein is the negative as negative; it lacks being. As an other, Schein must thereby lack the other's moment of being, Dasein, and contain only the moment of negation, Nichtdasein. But as pure negation (Nichtdasein), Schein is negation (Nicht dasein ) in its immediacy. Now immediacy is the determina tion of being, and Schein has, therefore, recovered the immediacy of being. The remarkable feature of essence is that its determination is not a transi tion to a new category, but is merely a moment of essence itself. First, we must show that Schein is the determinate ness of essence. Schein has already been distinguished from essence as the negation which is immediate. We need to show that these two are also determinations of essence.
Negation or not-being is a determination gg essence because essence is defined as the negative of being.
As we have already noted, essence is not-being. That immediacy must also be a determination of essence follows from the requirement that essence is the beyond of being which explains being. As explaining being, essence must be prior to it and thus immediate. We can also understand the immediacy of essence by means of a more technical argument. The negativity which we have just shown to be a determination of essence is not mere otherness but "absolug^ negativity for essence is in itself a negative of being.
The is determinateness or otherness. The absolute negativity of being is being itself which "has sublated itself^^oth as immediate being and also as immediate negation." Being preserves itself in its absolute negativity. This latter is the "equality with itself" (Gleichheit mit sich),^ and thereby essence is determined as an immediacy of being. There are clearly three steps to the argument. Essence is the absolute negativity of being; absolute negativity is essence's equality with itself; and equality with self is the determination of being. The first and third steps are clear; but I do not see the argument for the identity of absolute negativity and equality with self. Hegel may have made this identification prior to this section, but I have not been able to locate it. A similar and related identi fication, being ^ijd self-relation (Beziehung auf sich), does occur often3 and will soon emerge again. These two are not to be confused.
Whatever the argument may be, Hegel is claiming that the immediacy of essence follows from its negativity. This immediacy is, then, not the simple immediacy of being, but an immediacy mediated by negativity. The immediacy of essence is exactly the same reflected immediacy we dis covered in Schein. Thus, essence is determined as an immediate not-being. Therefore, the second proposition is proven: those determinations which distinguish Schein from essence, immediacy and not-being, are determinations of essence. Possessing the determinations which constitute Schein, essence is determined as Schein. Thus, the second proposition asserts that insofar as essence is not Schein, essence is Schein. Schein is, then, a determination of essence; but when we look closely at essence, we see that essence should lack determination. Consider the popular notion of essence as the beyond of being which explains being. Since essence explains being, essence must be understandable in itself. When we predicate one category of another, we are saying that the subject is understandable in terms of the category predicated of it. Therefore, since essence is understand able in itself, it should lack determinations. 
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However, essence is determined as Schein. But this deter mination is also sublated in essence because of the nature of essence. To understand this mechanism we need to consider essence and Schein closely. Unfortunately, there is no way of presenting Hegel's argument which is easier to understand than the text. Essence has been determined as Schein by dis covering the determinations of Schein in essence, the abso lute negativity which is immediacy.
'Essence is Schein,1 (1 Das Wesen scheint,') but essence and Schein are both immediate not-beings. Hence, the predication of one by the other is a self-relation. Therefore essence is self-related. In the categories of being, a self-relation adds additional content to a category and that category thereby becomes another category. In essence, however, the self-relation of essence belongs to the content of the category and does not add additional content. To see this we need only con sider the categories of essence and Schein in this deter mination .
A. Essence is absolute negativity which was shown to be an immediacy. The self-relation of essence is the negation of negation. The negation of essence is Schein (being in essence)
and essence, which has determined itself, is Schein. B. Schein is a negativity; it is nothing in essence. Further, it is nothing which is the negative and other of essence. As such it is the negative which has been determined ag^negative. In this self-relation Schein regains its immediacy.
As a negativity which is an immediacy Schein is essence. Therefore essence is negated when it is determined as Schein, but Schein as a determination of essence is merely essence itself.
The determination of essence by Schein is a self-relation which is a returning to essence. But what Schein returns into is identical to that which becomes Schein .^Essence is the unity of absolute negativity and immediacy.
But essence is determined as Schein. Schein is the absolute negativity of essence. The determination of essence by Schein is the negation of essence; but in this negating, Schein recovers its immediacy and becomes essence. Thus the determination of essence by Schein is the negation which is a return, and thereby an immediacy. Therefore the determination of essence by Schein is a self-relation which does not add anything to the content of essence. As a determination of essence, Schein is sublated in essence. In conclusion, insofar as 55WL, II, 23, 11 • 3-5 .
56SL, p. 398, 1. 11 •
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Schein is distinguished from essence it is a part of essence; the distinguishing of Schein from essence is the activity of essence itself.
Ill
Before we proceed with the argument we should note some points about the preceding argument which can easily be over looked in its complexity. First, we began the consideration of essence by considering the relation of being and essence. Because the Logic is the exposition of the categories we enter the consideration of each category x with the ques tion, 'what is x?' And because the Logic is the selfexposition of the categories we must answer this question in terms of other categories. Hegel's own consideration of essence follows this form more closely than our presenta tion. In considering the question, 'what is essence?' Hegel attempts to determine essence by means of the predication of other categories, the mode of relation in the sphere of being The initial consideration is whether being applies to essence and the conclusion that it does is mitigated with the insight that it equally does not. There are several points which must be made in conjunction with this and the preceding arguments:
(1) The predication of being to essence fails to do justice to the complexity of essence.
(2) This con sideration is not merely a path to be rejected or a thought experiment which fails but a necessary part of essence.
(3) Schein is not merely a determination of essence but the activity of essence itself.
(4) In essence predication itself proves to be an inadequate form of determination. (5) Essence which is understood as Schein is grasped without going beyond the rational.
(6) The argument can be phrased in Hegel's technical terminology of ari and f iir. (7) The argument is relevant to the problem of self-relation. After discussing these points we will briefly sketch the discussion of reflection, and then consider the transition to essence in Kantian terms, and as a refutation of Kantian philosophy. Finally we will raise questions concerning the Hegelian approach.
(1) "Essence is," but as such being is merely an other to essence and not its absolute negativity. It^s useful to refer to the analogy of essence to the past.
Is the past? The past is_ preserved as the past, but the past is also what is no longer. Thus we must answer this question 57SL, p. 389, 1. 14.
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C-3 in the affirmative but recognize that the determination of the past with being does not do justice to the complexity involved in this notion. The same is true of the determi nation of essence with being.
(2) Being as it is in essence is Schein. But Schein is present in essence as the negation of essence within itself, as we have seen. Essence determines itself as being or as immediacy. Therefore, the determination of essence by being which is considered in the section entitled "The Essential and the Unessential" is not a mistaken path which leads nowhere. Instead, it belongs to essence itself to determine itself as being. Likewise it belongs to essence to sublate this determinateness. Consequently, the sublation of this determination in Schein also belongs to the nature of essence. Thus, in these two sections, essence is engaging in that activity which is characteristic of essence. Hence, we must reject McTaggart's suggestion that the first categories of "Essence" which do not appear in the Encyclopedia could be elim^gated. They reflect the essential motion of the category.
(3) The determination of essence as Schein and the sublation of that determination belongs to essence itself. In non-technical language, essence is defined as a negative of being. Thus, essence is being; essence determines itself as being. And, equally, essence is not-being. Essence determines itself and sublates the determinateness. In more technical language, essence is absolute negativity, or negativity in itself. This negativity is not determined by any other category but is "only like itself." This Gleichheit mit sich is the immediacy of e^ence, Schein. Schein is, then, the "Schein of essence."
In other wgçds, essence itself is "das Scheinen seiner in sich selbst; " essence itself becomes immediate. Scheinen (as a verbal noun) is then the activity of essence. 
C-4 (4)
In the sphere of being, a category is determined by predicating another category of it. The predicates which come closest to being adequate to define their sub jects are the predicative forms of those very subjects. It is in the self-predication of a category that predicate is most adequate to subject. As we have noted a self predication asserts that the relation of a category to its own moments is the posited content of the category. In other words, a category does what it is. The problem we encountered with the self-predications of being is that the predication added new content to the original category which thereby underwent a transition to a new category. On the other hand, the determination of the category of essence with Schein is not a transition to a new category. Essence equally determines itself and sublates the deter mination. The determination of essence with Schein is, then, the going out from and returning to essence. This movement of essence is termed reflection and the return of self-relation. Like the categories of being, the content is mirrored in its relation with its moment, Schein. Although essence is determined with Schein, it is not a self-predication.
Unlike the categories of being, the identity of what
essence is with what it does is not expressed by a self predication . We have argued that essence is determined by Schein, and that because essence is identical with Schein, the determination is sublated. Thus, the determi nation of essence by Schein is a self-determination but not a mere self-predication. Because Schein is identical with essence, a predication of essence with it would not add anything to essence. This predication would thus achieve the ideal sought throughout being where the pre dicate expresses just what the subject is. However, in achieving this ideal, essence is identical with its determination. Therefore, essence sublates Schein in itself, and the presumed predication collapses into the unity of self-relation. In achieving the ideal of the predicates of being, Schein collapses as a predicate, and predication itself proves inadequate. Essence is in itself to be self-related. It is the movement which determines itself as Schein and sublates that determinateness. Because it is a movement, essence cannot be determined by means of predication. How, then, is essence determined? Part of the task of the consideration of reflection is to determine the movement which is reflection; i .e., to answer this question. Instead of the determinations of being which are determinate beings; i .e., negations, the determinations of essence are posited beings; it is the immediacy of the self-relation which determines essence. We will not go into more detail concerning the determinations of essence here. The point to be made is that determinations of essence are different from those of being, and that the latter deter minations prove themselves to be inadequate in essence.
(5) The result of the arguments we have presented is that Schein is essence in the determination of immediacy. Let us recall that when we began our discussion of essence, it seemed as if this word should denote an object beyond immediate experience. Instead, we have succeeded in explaining essence as Schein, which is immediate experience grasped as the negation of negation. Essence, then, is the idea of something beyond experience; but this idea can be understood as a relation of experience. Conversely, exper ience is not beyond essence, the sphere of understanding. For Schein is a determination of essence. The fact that being can be explained in terms of essence (in terms of understanding) confirms one of the goals of the Logic. This is the proof of an idea which can be expressed with the slogan, 'the real is rational.1 Immediate experience insofar as it is independent of understanding is a deter mination of it, Schein. Likewise, essence is not beyond experience; it is Schein which is experience as the nega tion of negation.
(6) We are now ready to consider the results of the argument in Hegel's more technical an and für terminology. Essence has emerged out of the category of indifference as what is in-and-for-itself (an und für sich) . This deter mination is the content of the category, its an_ moment. When we inquire into the meaning of essence we are explica ting its für moment. The significance of the fact that the in itself of essence is to be in-and-for-itself is apparent when we recall the character of these two moments. The moment of in itself (an) is the general moment of being; i .e., of positedness and immediacy; and the moment of for itself (für) is the general moment of relation. Since a relation is a determination and negation, the für moment is the moment of negation. Because the content of essence includes both moments, essence is the unity of immediacy and negation. We can express this by saying that essence is true being which is the negation of being.
The task Hegel executes in the section on essence is the explication of the catégorial relations of essence, its für moment. In the sphere of being, the content of a category is shown to mirror its relations to its moments by self predication. But in the sphere of being, this self-predica tion always added an additional content which altered the original category. In a self-predication, as we have seen, C-6 a category is both in-and-for-itself (ail und fiir sich) , and the predication adds one of these to the original category. A category which is self-predicated acquires as part of its content, the determination to be self-related. In the sphere of being this determination was always an addition to the content of the original category. Essence, however, is in-and-for-itself so that its self-relation is not an addition to its content,, and further its content is to be self-related.
Since essence contains immediacy in its content, its determination as Schein expresses what essence is. But
Schein is also the negative of essence. As a unity of immediacy and negation, Schein is essence itself. Thus, the determination of essence with Schein is a self-relation. The activity of essence is to determine itself as Schein and to negate this determination and return to itself. In this activity essence is an sich because it determines itself as immediate, and it is fiir sich because it returns to itself. Because essence determines itself and negates its determination, it participates in the activity of being an und fur sich. Therefore, essence is self-related.
(7)
The self-relation of essence is not a transition to another category but the return to the category essence. In the sphere of being, we predicated categories of each other in order to express the content of the category. Schein, however, does not merely express the content of essence. It is crucial to the understanding of essence that it determines itself as Schein and then negates the determination. The self-relation of the essence is not adequately expressed by predicating Schein of it because the self-relation of essence is not a predicate but the activity of returning to itself. In being, the activity of the category is expressed by the predicate which has a participial form. In essence the activity of the category belongs to the content of the category. The transition from being to essence is a transition from expressing self relation by means of self-predication to expressing self relation by an activity which returns to the original cate gory. In its active form, as determining itself and ŝ ublating this determination, essence is called reflection.
This discussion concludes the points we wished to make concerning the arguments for the determination of essence with Schein, and brings us to the consideration of reflection. 61SL, p. 399, 1. 16. We will not give these arguments in detail. We will merely attempt to show the distinction between the three forms of reflection based on a consideration of the content of essence.
IV
Essence, as containing Schein, has become reflection, the self-movement. Schein becomes reflection and is lost. The task of the consideration of reflection is to recover Schein in reflection; this goal is not achieved until "Determining Reflection." As Schein, essence is absolute negativity; i.e., the negative ari sich. A category which is ail sich is "only like itself" and thereby self-related. The selfrelation of negation is the negating of negation; it is the movement of negating itself. But the self-relation, or Gleichheit mit sich of negation is also its immediacy. Thus the immediacy of the negating movement which is absolute reflection is just this movement itself.
(1) Positing Reflection -In positing reflection imme diacy is grasped as a determination of negation as follows. Self-relating negativity is the transition from nothing to nothing. It is thus the negation of nothing which coincides with itself, the negative. As the "self-coinciding," nega tion is determined as immediate. In other words, immediacy is produced as a result of negation.
(2) External Reflection -"Absolute" reflection is negation in itself and thus self-relating negation. Selfrelating negation is the negation of negation; i.e., the negation of its own self. As the negation of itself, reflec tion presupposes a self to negate; it therefore presupposes an immediacy of which it is the negation. External reflec tion is the negating of a presupposed immediacy or being.
(3) Determining Reflection -
A.
Reflection has determined itself as positing and external; these are contradictory determinations which are to be united in determining reflection. External reflection negates an immediacy; but this negation is the^gositing of an other ag<| this other is "something posited," ein Gesetztes. 62s l , p. 406, 1. 3. 63w l , II. 32, 1. 17
Posited being (Gesetztsein) is only negation in itself, but as such it too is self-related or immediate. Thus, posited being is the presupposed immediacy, and the movement of reflection reflects it into itself. There are two moments present -the positedness, which is negation as such or immediacy, and the reflection into itself.
C.
It remains to grasp these two moments in the unity of the determinateness of reflection. Both moments have arisen out of essence determined as self-related negation. Positedness is the negation which is, at the same time, relation to itself. It is, then, the negation which is reflected into itself. Thus "the determinateness of r eflection is the relation to its otherness within itself. " With this conclusion a unity of immediacy and negation has been achieved. In the section titled "Schein.1 1 Schein is first identified with the immediacy of essence, and Schein is then grasped as the movement which is called reflectigg; "illusory being is the same thing as reflec tion ..."
While Schein is the moment of immediacy, reflection is the moment of negation. The task of the sections on reflection is to recover the immediacy of Schein within the movement which is reflection. We now * I see that this goal is achieved by understanding the movement as not merely negation but as a self-relation or reflectioninto-itself, and the terminus of the movement as a negation in itself, positedness. In other words, within reflection, negation as negation, we discover immediacy as the selfrelation which is the movement of reflection, while negation is the static moment, positedness. These moments are exactly the reverse of those of the beginning of the 64 SL, p. 407, last paragraph. chapter, where immediacy is the static moment, Schein, and negation the active moment, reflection.
Immediacy and Negation were united in Schein; but Schein is being in essence. The two moments were united at the cost of determining essence as its opposite, Schein, a determination which essence sublated in itself. Now, the two moments are again united as the determinateness of reflection; they are united not as essence deg^rmined as immediate, but as essence as it is in itself.
In itself, essence is positedness and reflection in£g itself, negation which is at the same time self-relation. Hegel has shown that (1) Schein is a determination of essence and that Schein is sublated in it, and that (2) reflection is the reflection of Schein. These are equiva lent to the claims that (1) intuition is a component of knowledge and that (2) thought has no validity beyond a possible intuition. We can understand these translations by recalling some of the arguments for Hegel's conclusions and phrasing them in Kantian language.
C-10
'What is knowledge?' is the guiding consideration. Knowledge (perceptual know ledge) is the knowledge of an intuition. But the intuition which is known is more than the intuition. The former, the known intuition, is just knowledge itself. Rather than say that intuition is a determination of knowledge, it makes more sense in this terminology to say that intuition is a component of knowledge. Perceptual knowledge is the known intuition, but it is also what is beyond intuition. Know ledge is the negation of intuition, and likewise intuition is the negation of knowledge. But how is intuition to be defined? There is a problem in the definition of intuition because the intuitive element of experience is distinguished from the discursive element by not being capable of lin guistic expression. We cannot, then, describe a category of elements which are intuitive elements without discur sively locating that category. Thus, we have nothing more to describe intuition other than the fact that it cannot be discursively described: intuition is the unthought element of experience. Intuition is, then, defined as the negation of thought; it is then also the negation of know ledge. We have shown above that intuition is also the other and negative of knowledge. Hence, it is the nega tion of knowledge which is the negation of knowledge; the negation as negation. This is precisely the definition of Schein.
Knowledge explains intuition but is not the same thing as it. Thus, knowledge is the knowledge of an intuition, the known intuition, but the known intuition is not merely an intuition but knowledge itself. The movement from knowledge to intuition and back to knowledge is reflection or thought.
The relation of thought to intuition is similar to that of knowledge and intuition. Thought is the movement between intuition and knowledge. Thought is then the negating of intuition. But thought (reflection) also explains intui tion and is thus a return to it. Thought is, then, for (fur) the intuition it explains. As such, thought is the negation of negation which returns to intuition. For example, suppose we are presented with an intuition and we think it as "chair." The thought is other than the intuition and hence the negation of it, but this thought expresses what the intuition is. Empirical thought returns to intuition and negates itself. We think "chair" and thereby negate the intuition, but we do so in order to explain the intuition. The determination "chair" is a negation which negates itself. Hegel is con sidering abstract thought and intuition, not the specific determination we have used as an illustration. But the idea is the same. Abstract thought (reflection) is the negation of negation which is immediacy or intuition. Thus, thought is not defined beyond intuition. 
These two conclusions, that intuition is a necessary
C-12
transcendental in making knowledge possible.
As a condi tion of knowledge, it^gequires that we bring our represen tations to the unity, and the manner ii^gWhich we unite our representations is by thinking them.
Thus, all representations, including intuitions, must be capable of thought.
And since thought is the means whereby the representations are brought to unity, it presupposes some representation and thus ultimately some intuition. Thougt^g does not, then, validly extend beyond possible intuition.
The preceding paragraph is a sketch of a difficult section in a difficult work. The point is that the uniting of thought and intuition, thinking an intuition, is justi fied by a third, the transcendental unity of apperception. Because intuitions must be capable of being brought to this unity they must be capable of being thought, the latter being the means whereby they are brought to the unity. While Kant needs to resort to a third to unite thought and intuition, Hegel shows that both are determinations of perceptual knowledge. Intuition (Schein) is independent of knowledge but insofar as it is independent it is sublated in knowledge. Thus it belongs to the definition of knowledge to be about and explain what is not knowledge, intuition. This explaining of intuition is thinking. Per ceptual knowledge is the unity of its two elements, intui tion and thought; but these elements must be distinguished in order to understand perceptual knowledge as the think ing of an immediate element itself distinguished from thought. We understand perceptual knowledge in terms of these two distinct elements; but these two elements are united in perceptual knowledge. Insofar as intuition can be distinguished from thought (as the unthought element of knowledge), the two are grasped as the elements of knowledge and thereby united in it. Further, since thought is merely a determination of knowledge, it does not extend beyond (perceptual) knowledge. Thus, for Hegel, a thinking of an intuition is explained as knowledge determining itself as both immediacy and negation. Hegel explains how thought and intuition arise out of the idea of perceptual know-74 74Kant, B 132 .
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Kant, B 131-132. Thus, Hegel's criticisms of Kant are that the Kantian analysis is self-negating, and that it presupposes that which it purports to prove. Kant treats of thought and knowledge, yet he employs thought in the treatment; and the attainment of knowledge of knowledge presupposes some idea of knowledge to start with. Hegel's remedy for both of these criticisms is the genesis of the categories by means of self-relation. Kant's analysis is self-contradictory because it presupposes what it proves. Hegel sees the necessity of a self-related thinking about thinking, and he develops this insight by defining the categories by means of each other, by the self-exposition of the categories. As we have seen, self-relation plays an impor tant role in the determination of many categories. It is not until the end of the Logic that this self-relation succeeds in avoiding self-contradiction. This criticism is, I believe, a misapprehension of Hegel's approach. Hegel is inquiring into intuition and thought by considering the character of the idea of perceptual knowledge. The mistake is in presuming that these conclu sions concern the objects, intuition and thought. Again, logic is the self-exposition of the categories; thus, it treats only of the categories. Whether there are objects which correspond to these categories is of no concern to Hegel's Logic. Furthermore the idea that there is a dis tinction between an object and its concept itself involves a distinction among categories, and this distinction, in fact, happens to be the category treated in the section of "Essence." Therefore, the Hegelian inguiry into thought and intuition does not tell us about the objects these terms denote but about the ideas themselves.
Pursuing this line, we might wonder, what is the conse quence of demonstrating the collapse of the sphere of being, or of the categories of essence? The correct answer to this question is that, in each case, we pass to a new category. However, we are tempted, in answering the ques tion, to consider the collapse of a category in relation to our use of that category. Does the collapse of a cate gory preclude using the category? A quick glance at the Logic is sufficient to show that the answer to this ques tion is in the negative. We continue to use the categories of mathematics, of measure, and of science even though they collapse when we think them and we are forced to pass to higher categories. Hegel seems to presume that his analysis of the meaning of a category will provide a basis for criticizing Kant's notion of the use of a category, and thus that the meaning of a category does relate to the use. Apparently, the presumption is that we must understand the meaning of a category before we can use it. But if we must understand the meaning of a category before we can use it, and under standing the meaning of a category does not tell us any thing about the use, we have fallen into an impossible contradiction. The possibility that the categories can be material as well as formal rests upon the self-relation of the cate gories, for the Hegelian category is defined by its appli cation to itself just as the Kantian category is defined by its application to intuition. The self-relation of the category enables Hegel to define it without bringing in its reference. The content of the Hegelian category is either other categories or itself, and since the categories have evolved out of being and nothing, the ultimate content of the categories is being and nothing and their relations.
This contradiction is only illusory. If I interpret
In contrast to the Hegelian treatment of the content of a category, we should note the tendency of modern philosophy to treat the categories in terms of their reference or of the use that we make of them. Since such categories as "cause," "truth," etc. have no particular reference, they are treated in terms of their use. As I interpret him, Wittgenstein argued against ideas on the grounds that ideas are supposed to be what enable us to use a word, but we can use a word without an idea.
Therefore, ideas are not necessary.
Hegel, as we have presented him, argues that the meaning of an idea does not affect its use. Thus, he agrees with Wittgenstein that we use words (and ideas) without knowing the idea. Yet,Wittgenstein concludes that we need not discuss ideas, while Hegel treats ideas in the Logic, which is wisdom itself. Both Hegel and Wittgenstein agree that a treatment of the ideas can be of no use to us. Why, then, does Hegel devote the Logic to them? This question strikes at the root of all metaphysics. On the one hand, metaphysics is the most valuable of sciences; on the other hand, by its very nature it has no use. From Hegel's point of view its value is internally defined. Reasoning is itself metaphys ics . When we reason about something we are using ideas about ideas. Reasoning is inherently self-referential. Much that is usually taken to be the result of empirical investigation is shown to emerge from the analysis of ideas. The path whereby these things emerge, the reasoning, is knowledge. And knowledge is something which is valuable for its own sake.
Through this analysis we can understand the meaning of the famous Hegelian slogan, 'the real is rational. ' The idea is that reasoning is self-contained and self-sufficient. As we have noted, through self-reference the categories can be defined without reference to externals. The real is rational because the ideas can be understood only in terms of other ideas. With this Hegel is rejecting two kinds of externals, the material world and transcendent objects. As we have seen, "being" is itself an idea in the Logic. The material world is treated only insofar as it can be thought; i.e., as the categories of the sphere of being. On the other hand, we need not go beyond the ideas either.
As we saw in the discussion of essence, the idea of this latter can be defined in terms of other categories, even though "essence" is supposed to be something beyond being. The self-relation of the categories permits the self exposition of the categories, the explanation of the categories only in terms of each other.
VI
In this paper we have explained the function of self relation in various ways. First, we have examined some of the categories of being and showed how they are deter mined by means of themselves, the meaning of self-determina tion, and why the self-determination leads to a contradiction. Next, we have examined how the contradictions of the sphere of being between the an and fur moments of a category are resolved in essence because the category is an und fiir sich. This resolution is accomplished by means of a new form of self-relation ; the categories of essence are not selfpredicated as those of being, but contain their selfrelation in themselves. But the self-relation of essence is self-related negation and thus contains within itself its negation. The determination of essence is the first fruit of the Hegelian approach, for essence is thereby seen in terms of other categories and not as something beyond, not in terms of an immediacy. Finally, we have considered how self-relation is at the basis of Hegel's criticisms of Kant, and then tried to show how Hegel might defend himself from a Kantian criticism by pointing to the self relation of categories. As we might expect of such a central topic much more culd be said about it. Clearly it plays a significant role in the Logic. We have considered the topic in terms of the Hegelian approach. While I think that this paper has explained that approach, I am still not certain about the ultimate value of that approach.
In conclusion, let us take note of some of the ways the topic of the self-relation of the categories has appeared. First, the categories are defined in terms of each other and themselves. Second, in a self-predication, the content of the category is identified with the relation of the cate gory to its moments. There is an interplay between the cate gory and its relation to its moments; the relation of the category to its moments is a part of the content and can contradict the other parts.
Third, (in consequence of the second) the category is what it does. The being of the category is identified with its activity, for the category relates itself to other categories; it determines itself. Fourth, the self-relation of the categories is^ their self-exposition; i .e., the self-relation is the development which is the Logic. In this latter sense, self-relation is the identity of theoretical and practical in the 'Absolute Idea': being is as it manifests itself, and this manifes tation is_ the self-relation of being. Finally, in a nega tive sense, self-relation serves to exclude defining an idea in terms of what is not an idea, either a material or a transcendent object.
Thus, we end where we began, with the assertion that the Logic is the self-exposition of the categories. Now, though, we can understand the meaning of "self-exposition" as the self-relation of the categories (point four above), and why and how the meaning of "self-exposition" alters from being to essence. And this understanding is only a part of under standing the self-exposition of "self-exposition" which is Hegel's Science of Logic.
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